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Over the last decade, numerous studies have 
examined the remarkable appreciation of 
cryptocurrencies and have typically focused on their 
price and the factors that predict them. In contrast, 
this paper argues that the success of a cryptocurrency 
is determined not only by its monetary value but also 
by the proliferation of its end users. Specifically, we 
hypothesize that changes in developers’ and miners’ 
activities drive the growing proliferation of a 
cryptocurrency’s end users. Building on the Bitcoin 
case, we use a time-series model based on 4,285 
Bitcoin daily observations to suggest that changes in 
the number of end users are anticipated by surges or 
drops in activity by the developers and miners who 
develop and maintain the network. We further find a 
limited relationship between these variables and the 
price of Bitcoin. These results support an alternative 
view of cryptocurrencies’ success and highlight 
further research avenues in this nascent domain.  
1. Introduction  
Blockchain is frequently referred to as one of the 
main technological innovations of the 21st century, 
with the potential to reshape and disrupt a range of 
economic activities [1]. Blockchain was developed as 
a supporting technology for the cryptocurrency 
Bitcoin [2]. More broadly, blockchain has been 
described as key to the development of the Internet of 
Value [3], whereby blockchain can provide the 
foundational technology [4] that might enable a global 
peer-to-peer value exchange infrastructure.  
In the first half of 2021, the cryptocurrencies 
market has gained global attention due to an 
unpredictable sequence of events. First, many 
incumbents, such as Microstrategy, Square and Tesla, 
have entered the market, acquiring significant amounts 
of cryptocurrencies (mainly Bitcoin) as a store of 
value. Second, as a natural consequence of this 
corporate interest, the market reached its All-Time-
High (ATH) market capitalization of $2.4T [5], led by 
the rapid growth of several cryptocurrencies, including 
Bitcoin, Ethereum, Cardano, and Doge, to name a few. 
Third, the market faced a sharp decrease after tweets 
by Elon Musk criticized Bitcoin’s energy consumption 
[6]. Finally, it faced a second drastic decrease after the 
Chinese government banned Bitcoin [7].  
The volatility of the market has fueled doubts, 
with many experts in the field wondering if 
cryptocurrencies have any intrinsic value. As just one 
example, Steven Hanke, an economist at Johns 
Hopkins University, tweeted on March 13th, 2021, 
“Remember what I have said since day 1: Bitcoin is a 
highly speculative asset, with a fundamental value of 
ZERO!”  
Many academics have searched for a viable model 
to justify the value of cryptocurrencies. The initial 
attempts (e.g., [8]–[11]) have generally developed 
price-formation models considering either economic 
or market aspects. Subsequent researchers (e.g., [12]) 
developed models focused on other aspects, such as 
the miners’ activities. Further, some researchers (e.g., 
[13], [14]) introduced the idea of correlating the 
developers’ activity with the price of a cryptocurrency.  
All of these studies have a common line of reasoning: 
they study cryptocurrencies from the price 
perspective, with the assumption that price is the only 
indicator of success. 
Inspired by the network effects literature (e.g., 
[15]), we argue that the success of a cryptocurrency is 
not represented only by its price but also by the 
proliferation of its end users. The idea that the success 
of software technology is represented by the 
proliferation of its end users comes from the open-
source software (OSS) theory; multiple researchers 
have considered OSS success in terms of the size of 
the consumer base [16]–[19].    
Subsequently, we argue that a successful 
cryptocurrency emerges from the activities of two 
communities at its basis: developers and miners.  





Thus, this paper explores the following research 
question:  
 
What is the effect of developers’ and miners’ activity 
on the proliferation of a cryptocurrency’s end users? 
 
To answer this question, we rely on a time-series 
analysis of a single case of cryptocurrency: Bitcoin.  
We selected Bitcoin for two major reasons. First, 
Bitcoin is the cryptocurrencies market leader, 
accounting for 40% of the entire market in June 2021. 
Second, a fundamental prerequisite to developing 
significant time-series analysis is the availability of 
large amounts of data. As the oldest cryptocurrency, 
Bitcoin offers a longer timeline to study than any other 
cryptocurrency in the market.  
The study is structured as follows. In section 2, we 
provide a literature review. In section 3, we describe 
the collected data. In section 4, we describe the 
exploratory and statistical analysis.  Finally, in section 
5, we provide some concluding remarks on the basis 
of the statistical insights.   
2. Literature Review  
Consistent with previous studies, our literature 
review focuses on Bitcoin research. Other 
cryptocurrencies have thus far received limited 
attention except in the case of idiosyncracies in those 
currencies (e.g., Libra’s association with Facebook 
[20],  Monero’s focus on privacy [21]).  
In this section, we discuss the foundation of 
Bitcoin, give an overview of existing attempts to 
develop a value-formation model, and introduce a new 
approach integrating prior attempts.  
2.1 Bitcoin Foundations  
Bitcoin was the original blockchain protocol and 
remains the most famous of its technological 
applications. The first Bitcoin white paper [2] was 
released on 31 October 2008 on a cryptography 
mailing list by a person (or group) operating under the 
pseudonym “Satoshi Nakamoto”. Nakamoto claimed 
to have worked “on a new electronic cash system 
that’s fully peer-to-peer, with no trusted third party”. 
Two crucial innovations underpin Bitcoin [22]: 
the public and distributed ledger technology called 
“blockchain”, which securely maintains an immutable 
record of all user transactions, and the existence of an 
open network of users called “miners”, who lend 
computing power to secure the network in exchange 
for newly minted Bitcoins [23], [24].  
Bitcoin officially went online on 3 January 2009, 
with the unveiling of the Genesis Block, the first block 
of data ever created. Since then, it has been maintained 
by two communities in collaboration: the communities 
of developers and miners.  
 
2.1.1 Community of Developers. From a technical 
point of view, Bitcoin runs on an open-source software 
program, called “Bitcoin Core”, which is supported by 
ongoing protocol updates [25]. Bitcoin Core is mainly 
managed by an open community of developers 
through a page on GitHub, a hosting site where 
developers can upload program code and work 
collaboratively to improve it. This way of 
collaborating resembles the community-based 
management of other free open-source software 
developments (F/OSSD) like Linux and Apache.  
For Bitcoin, communities of volunteer software 
developers collaborate in a hierarchical network and 
self-select into tasks and roles based on expertise and 
preferences. As with other F/OSSD, the leadership 
(and the control it brings) is evident in the roles 
outlined by the community organizational hierarchy. 
These roles carry titles such as “developer,” “module 
maintainer,” and “release manager.” Other roles are 
less formal [26]. The most important tasks developers 
address in GitHub are: (1) commits, (2) pull requests, 
and (3) issues. From the official GitHub Glossary, a 
commit is a “revision” – that is, an individual change 
to a file (or set of files). Pull requests are proposed 
changes to a repository submitted by a user and 
accepted or rejected by a repository’s collaborators. 
Issues are suggested improvements, tasks or questions 
related to the repository; they can be created by anyone 
and are moderated by repository collaborators.  
Developers without commit rights to a project 
must “fork” the project, creating a personal copy of the 
code that they can change freely. They can then submit 
some or all of the changes to the original project by 
issuing a pull request. The project owner or another 
member with commit rights can then merge their 
changes. Developers can also communicate about 
code-related actions by submitting a comment on a 
commit, an issue, or a pull request [27]. This strict and 
formalized structure of Bitcoin has been termed 
“senatorial governance” by Parkin [28].   
As of May 2021, Bitcoin Core on GitHub 
registered a total of ~1,890 commits, ~750 pull 
requests and ~1,100 issues.  
 
2.1.2 Community of Miners. Bitcoin relies on a 
distributed network [29], which is composed of miners 
who collect, verify, and update transactions on a 
shared public ledger that is publicly auditable [22]. 
The mining process is a specific cryptographic 
technique required to add new transactions in a shared 
ledger into “blocks” of information. Mining is a 
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lottery-based process that often requires billions of 
guesses before a suitable verification solution can be 
found and a miner can add a block in the shared ledger. 
A miner’s probability of being able to provide the 
“proof-of-work” depends on the computing power the 
miner controls [22]. The difficulty of the problem 
miners must solve changes every 2016 blocks, 
increasing or decreasing on the basis of the average 
computational power used by the network to mine the 
previous 2016 block (a value called “hash rate”), to 
ensure that a new block is mined every ~10 minutes.  
On 30 April 2021, the hash rate of Bitcoin was 
~170,000,000 TH/s (Terahash per second), meaning 
that every second 170^18 combinations are tried in 
order to solve this cryptographic puzzle.  
Miners receive two types of rewards for this job. 
First, they receive new coins for each new block they 
generate. Second, they receive transaction fees from 
the transactions in each new block they generate. The 
number of newly generated bitcoins received from 
mining a block decreases every 210,000 blocks. This 
number started at 50 bitcoins per block in January 
2009, then halved to 25 bitcoins per block in 
November 2012, then halved a second time to 12.5 
bitcoins per block in July 2016. Based on this formula, 
Bitcoin mining rewards will decrease exponentially 
until approximately the year 2140, when all bitcoins 
(20.99999998 million) will have been issued.  
2.2 Bitcoin Price Formation Models 
Given its high visibility and intrinsically 
disruptive nature [30], Bitcoin has attracted a great 
deal of attention across different academic disciplines 
[31]. Many academics have aimed at identifying the 
determinants of Bitcoin’s value.   
One of the first contributions was by Buchholz et 
al. [8] that focused on the number of Bitcoins in 
circulation, the number of daily transactions in 
Bitcoin, the total daily volume of transactions in 
Bitcoin, and the number of searches with the query 
“Bitcoin” derived from Google Trends.  
Subsequently, Kristoufek [9] proposed a model to 
explain the speculative components in the formation 
of Bitcoin’s price. Kristoufek hypothesized that the 
variation in price could be explained by the investors’ 
interest, which could be determined through two 
proxies: the number of searches made on Google using 
the term “Bitcoin” and the number of unique visits to 
the Bitcoin page of Wikipedia. The findings suggested 
the value of Bitcoin is based purely on speculation, 
indicating that value might follow the dynamics of a 
bubble market, corroborating Buchholz’s perspective. 
In the same year, Van Wijk [10] studied the 
relationship between Bitcoin’s price and several 
macroeconomic variables. Van Wijk’s model 
highlighted a relationship between Bitcoin's price and 
the Dow Jones Index, in both the short and the long 
term. Findings also suggested a long-term relationship 
between Bitcoin’s price, the Euro/Dollar exchange 
rate, and the WTI oil price. 
Ciaian et al. [11] integrated the results of these 
studies. Those authors analyzed Bitcoin’s price trend 
in relation to demand/supply functions, investors’ 
interests, and macroeconomic variables. Their results 
further supported the accumulating body of research 
on Bitcoin’s price.   
Subsequently, Hayes [32] hypothesized a 
connection between Bitcoin’s price and its cost of 
production (i.e., the cost related to the mining 
process). The findings demonstrated that adding the 
hash rate to predictive models could explain up to 80% 
of the variance in Bitcoin’s price. Taking this cost 
view further, Bouoiyour and Selmi [33] ran multiple 
models and concluded that, in the long run, Bitcoin’s 
price seemed to be primarily influenced by only one 
element – the hash rate. 
In 2018, Abbatemarco et al. [12] described the 
costs and revenues that the Bitcoin network supports 
in order to ensure its operativity. Those authors 
demonstrated that Bitcoin has a dedicated hardware 
infrastructure with cost and profit functions 
comparable to those of a normal production facility.  
Next, Trockman et al. [14] investigated the 
relationship between active communities of 
developers and the price of some cryptocurrencies. 
The authors did not identify any compelling evidence 
for causality between development activity metrics 
and market cap [13].  
2.3 Proliferation of End Users: A Metric for 
Bitcoin Success  
The evolution of Bitcoin literature shows a 
gradual shift from modelling Bitcoin as an asset to 
modelling it as a network. 
Inspired by network effects literature in the 
software market (as a general reference: [15]), we 
believe that an additional metric for Bitcoin success 
might be the proliferation of its end users.  
The idea that a product will become more 
successful as the number of its end users grows is 
generally accepted by economists (e.g., [34]–[36]). 
Currencies provide one of the cleanest examples of 
network effects: the more popular a currency is, the 
more useful it is, and the more easily it attracts new 
users. Thus, the proliferation of end users is a factor 
that should be considered in the case of 
cryptocurrencies as well.  
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 Moreover, the idea of considering the number of 
users in measuring the success of software programs 
is also confirmed by many academics in the F/OSSD 
literature. For example, Sen et al. ([19]) introduced the 
idea of measuring the success of F/OSSD projects with 
the total number of “subscriber users”. As Bitcoin is 
open-source software, we believe that Sen et al.’s 
perspective can be applied to this case as well.  
In Bitcoin, end users are represented by a specific 
cryptographic fingerprint, called an address, used in 
the same way as the beneficiary name on a check [37].  
We thus consider the total number of addresses on 
the Bitcoin system as another metric for Bitcoin’s 
success.  
Further, building on the view of Bitcoin as a 
production network, we hypothesize that the number 
of end users will vary according to increased or 
reduced activity in the two main contributing groups: 
 
H1: Developers’ activity affects the proliferation of a 
cryptocurrency’s end users.  
 
H2: Miners’ activity affects the proliferation of a 
cryptocurrency’s end users.   
 
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the 
research model.  
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual research model 
2.4 An Integrated Approach  
To measure the activity of the community of 
developers, we measure the total number of coding 
activities on the Bitcoin GitHub page. To measure the 
activity of the community of miners, we measure the 
total amount of computing power of the Bitcoin 
network. Finally, Bitcoin’s end users proliferation is 




Table 1 provides an overview of the variables.  
Table 1. Overview of variables 
Variable Description Ref 
Developers’ 
Activity  
Total amount of  
activity on GitHub [13], [14] 
Miners’  
Activity  
Total amount of  
computing power [12], [32]  
Proliferation 
of End Users 
Number of  
end users [19], [38]–[40] 
3. Data Collection 
To answer our research question, we start by 
collecting daily data about Bitcoin. Specifically, we 
focus our attention on three main variables: 
developers’ activities, miners’ activities and number 
of end users. We gathered daily observations, 
beginning on 30 August 2009, the first date for which 
all the necessary data were available, and ceasing 20 
May 2021, for a total of 4,285 observations.  
 
Developers’ activity. As mentioned in the literature 
review, Bitcoin developers mainly collaborate via the 
Bitcoin page of GitHub.  
Inspired by the work of van Tonder et al. [13], we 
developed a customized script with Python and 
downloaded the number of daily commits from the 
Bitcoin Core page on GitHub. 
 
Miners’ activity. The computing power of Bitcoin is 
measured with a value called hash rate. The hashing 
power is estimated from the number of blocks being 
mined in the last 24 hours and the current block 
difficulty. More specifically, given the average time T 
between mined blocks and a difficulty D, the estimated 
hash rate per second H is given by the formula: H = 
232 D / T.  
The daily hash rate is available from many 
websites. We selected the website Cryptocompare 
from which to download the data for two reasons: 1) 
the availability of a wide range of daily data and 2) the 
availability of open APIs. Subsequently, we developed 
a Python script that allowed us to download all the 
required data. 
 
Proliferation of end users. The proliferation of 
Bitcoin’s end users is measured by the number of 
active addresses. Active addresses correspond to users 
who made at least 1 transaction per day. Considering 
the vast number of “dormant addresses” [41] and to 
avoid the risk of overestimating the amount of Bitcoin 
end users, active addresses were considered a more 
accurate metric for end users. As in the case of the 
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aforementioned metrics, we downloaded these data 
from Cryptocompare.  
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the metrics. 
Table 2. Overview of metrics 






Number of commits of 
GitHub Bitcoin repository 
Miners’  
Activity  Hash rate Hash rate (TeraHash/s) 
Proliferation 




Number of addresses with 
at least 1 transaction per 
day 
4. Exploratory Analysis 
Before exploring the presence of any relationships 
among the aforementioned variables, we conducted 
some exploratory analyses. All the analyses described 
in this research paper have been conducted using R 
4.1.0, a free advanced software environment 
for statistical computing and graphics.  
The data used in the analysis are time series data, 
which constitute a sequence of data points indexed in 
time order. Before exploring the presence of any 
relationships among the different time series, we 
analyzed the data in their original form.   
Table 3 provides an overview of the three time 
series, analyzed by minimum value, maximum value, 
average value and standard deviation.  
Table 3. Time series – general overview 
Metric Active Addresses Commits  
Hash  
Rate 
Min 0 0 0.00000942 
Max 1,368,446 61 199,064,807 
Average 375,210 8.18 23,646,982 
Standard 
Deviation 364,695 7.22 44,024,151 
 
By analyzing Table 3, it is possible to gain some 
insights about the time series.  
It is likely that active addresses and hash rate have 
an incremental evolution over time, while commits do 
not. This means the difference between the minimum 
value and the maximum value of the three time series 
is significant.  
Hash rate has the highest difference between min 
and max. This suggests that the computing power of 
Bitcoin value has drastically increased over time. 
Similar behavior is shown by active addresses, which 
has increased from 0 to 1.3 million.  
Commits have more linear growth, with a reduced 
standard deviation. To get a visual representation of 
the three different timeseries, we generated the related 
plots. Figures 2-4 represents the evolution of active 




Figure 2. Number of active addresses 
 
Figure 3. Number of commits 
 
Figure 4. Total hash rate (TH/s) 
The three plots confirmed the different trajectories of 
growth over time. Active addresses show an 
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incremental evolution over time, with some peaks 
(2018 and 2021) followed by some crashes. Commits 
show a more erratic pattern. Finally, hash rate shows 
consistent positive growth, again with seemingly 
erratic changes.  
5. Statistical Analysis 
To test the relationship between active addresses, 
number of commits and hash rate, we adopted two 
models: the Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model and 
Granger Causality Test (GCT).  
VAR is a stochastic process model that is useful 
to explore whether two time series (A and B) can 
predict each other.  
GCT allows us to understand the order (i.e., 
direction) of prediction (i.e., A à B and/or B à A).   
In our specific case, we are interested in analyzing 
whether commits and hash rate are useful to forecast 
active addresses.  
5.1 Preliminary Analysis 
Before applying VAR and GCT, some 
preliminary analyses of the data are required. In fact, 
Engle and Granger [42] demonstrated that using these 
models in the presence of non-stationary variables can 
lead to spurious results.   
Therefore, the first step in the analysis was to 
determine whether the three series were stationary. We 
tested for the presence of a unit root through the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The results 
suggest that active addresses and commits present 
stationary time-series (p-value < 0.01), while hash rate 
is likely non-stationary (p-value = 0.9). In the case of 
non-stationarity, a typical approach to obtain 
stationarity is called differencing [43]. Thus, we 
calculated the first difference of the hash rate time-
series and reexamined the outcome using the ADF 
stationarity test. The results suggested this value was 
stationary (p-value < 0.01).  
Another crucial test before performing VAR is to 
determine a suitable number of ‘lags’ (previous values 
for each variable). To do this, the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) was applied. The number of lags 
selected was 7 for commits and 7 for hash rate.   
5.2 Vector Auto Regressive Model 
In a VAR model, each variable is modeled as a 
combination of past values of itself and past values of 
other variables.  
Since there is a combination of multiple time 
series influencing each other, the VAR model is 
framed as a system of equations with one equation per 
variable. For example, the system of equations for a 
VAR (1) model with two time series (variables Y1 and 
Y2) is as follows: 
 
𝑌!,# =	𝛼!	 +	𝛽!!,!𝑌!,#%! + 𝛽!&,!𝑌&,#%! + 𝜀!,# 
𝑌&,# =	𝛼& +	𝛽&!,!𝑌!,#%! + 𝛽&&,!𝑌&,#%! + 𝜀!,# 
 
Where, Y1,t-1 and Y2,t-1 represent the first lag of 
time series Y1 and Y2, respectively. The above 
equation is referred to as a VAR(1) model, because 
each equation is of order 1; that is, it contains up to one 
lag of each of the predictors (Y1 and Y2). In our case, 
the number of lags is 7 for each model. Moreover, Y1 
is always active addresses, while Y2 is commits in 
Model 1 and hash rate in Model 2.  
In the first VAR model, the variance explained 
with the combination of active addresses and commits 
was 98% (Multiple R-Squared = 0.9811). As a result 
of the iterations between the two time series, 10 out of 
14 iterations registered a significant correlation (p-
value < 0.05).  
In the second VAR model, the variance explained 
with the combination of active addresses and hash 
rate was 98% (Multiple R-Squared = 0.9817). As a 
result of the iterations between the two time series, 11 
out of 14 iterations registered a significant correlation 
(p-value < 0.05).  
5.3 Granger Causality Test 
The VAR models demonstrated the relationship 
among the three variables. We next applied the GCT 
to examine the directionality between variables. First, 
we applied this function to test our initial hypotheses, 
H1 and H2.  
 
Table 4 shows the result of the two GCT tests.  
Table 4. GCT, first results 
Time Series GCT Results P-Value 
Commits to  
Active Addresses  Granger-Cause < 0.0001(***) 
Hash Rate to  
Active Addresses Granger-Cause < 0.0001(***) 
 
From this first analysis, it appears that commits 
and hash rate affect active addresses. Next, we 
consider the possibility of bidirectional relationships, 
which commonly occur in GCT [44]. This means that 
the active addresses could affect the future of commits 
and hash rate, and the number of current active 
addresses could be correlated to the number of future 
active addresses.  
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Table 5 provides an overview of additional tests.  
Table 5. GCT, second results 
Time Series GCT Results P-Value 
Active Addresses 
to Commits  Granger-Cause 0.023 (*) 
Active Addresses 
to Hash Rate Granger-Cause 0.012 (*) 
Commits to  
Hash Rate No 0.309 (not sig) 
Hash Rate to  
Commits No 0.235 (not sig) 
 
The results suggest that changes in active 
addresses may also drive changes in the number 
commits and hash rate, although the effect is more 
uncertain.  
Moreover, we wanted to examine whether the 
newly proposed metric of success is redundant with 
existing price-based measures of success. If Bitcoin’s 
price is more closely related to its production effort, 
then the number of active addresses may not be a 
useful alternative measure. We thus compared the 
number of active addresses with Bitcoin’s trading 
price. To achieve stationarity in price, we followed the 
same approach described above (Differencing and 
ADF Test) and then applied the GCT Test. Table 6 
illustrates the results.  
Table 6. GCT, third results 
Time Series GCT Results P-Value 
Price to  
Commits  No  0.486 (not sig) 
Commits to  
Price No 0.114 (not sig) 
Price to  
Hash Rate No 0.087 (not sig) 
Hash Rate to  
Price Granger-Cause 0.0207 (*) 
 
The results identified no relationship of the 
variables with commits and a possible mono-
directional relationship between hash rate and price. 
These results support a less significant coupling 
between Bitcoin’s price and its network growth, when 
compared with the number of active addresses. 
Finally, the same time-series models were applied 
to all addresses, as opposed to active addresses only. 
The results of these models are comparable: VAR 
models are significant, and the GCT suggests that 
changes in hash rate and commits affect all addresses 
as well. These results confirm the validity of our study 
beyond the initial approximation, indicating 
robustness to the selection of subsets of addresses.  
4. Discussion 
Blockchain is the cornerstone of a new economic 
cooperation paradigm characterized by greater 
decentralization, transparency, security and privacy. 
This paradigm is aimed at incorporating every trust-
related concept (e.g., governance, accountability and 
risk) at a technological level, thus enabling the 
creation of a trustless and secure network without the 
need for intermediaries [12].  
Cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, have attracted 
the attention of information technology professionals, 
economists, investors, banks, government, and even 
the police [45]. The research about cryptocurrency has 
increased over the years in several disciplines, 
including business, economy, technology, law, 
philosophy, and criminology, demonstrating the 
relevance of this topic [25], [45]. One research topic 
that has always captured great attention is the value of 
a cryptocurrency. 
  Cryptocurrencies are open-source software 
programs maintained by a community of developers 
and a community of miners that provide the computing 
power to maintain the entire network. Therefore, 
consistent with existing network effects literature, a 
useful metric for assessing the success of a 
cryptocurrency is the proliferation of end users who 
are using the technology. Bank notes, telephones and 
the Internet have shown that the success of financial 
systems depends not only on the underlying 
technologies but also on the acceptance of the systems 
by large numbers of users.   
This study hypothesized that developers’ and 
miners’ activity both affect the number of Bitcoin end 
users. Results supported these hypotheses, providing a 
statistical model that demonstrates how the number of 
Bitcoin end users is preceded by two factors: the 
amount of work that has been done by the developers 
and the full computing power of the distributed 
network at its basis.  
These findings suggest that, to become successful, 
a cryptocurrency should exploit an active community 
of developers dedicated to maintaining the software 
code at its basis and an extended distributed network 
of miners running the code (i.e., storing and updating 
the blockchain, confirming transactions and creating 
new blocks of information).  
We thus find further support for Wang’s [46] 
perspective on F/OSSD survival factors, which 
highlighted developers’ participation and service 
quality as predictors of survival for both early- and 
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late-stage projects. These findings also have more 
general implications for blockchain.  
First, the role of developers suggests that the 
success of a cryptocurrency may rely heavily on the 
quality of the code at its core. This conclusion is 
important because it undermines the contrasting 
explanations of Bitcoin’s success as a ‘Greater Fool’ 
Ponzi scheme driven solely by hype (see [47] for more 
discussion). The focus on technology as opposed to 
price also warrants some optimism that known issues 
with cryptocurrencies may receive ongoing attention 
(e.g., performance, volatility, reliability, unforeseen 
emerging standards and regulations, and energy cost) 
[48].  
Second, our findings suggest that the network size 
is vital for the survivability of cryptocurrencies. Some 
authors have predicted that contemporary 
cryptocurrencies will give way to newer iterations 
once the issues are resolved [49]. Others have argued 
that cryptocurrencies will gradually fall away until 
they are only used for niche markets or in countries 
with weak currencies. However, the network effects 
we observe between miners, developers, and end users 
undermine those predictions. The Bitcoin community 
of developers is the most active developer community 
in the cryptocurrency market, building on more than a 
decade of developers’ and miners’ activity. For 
comparison, Bitcoin Core registered a total of 4,520 
commits in 2020, while the second most successful 
blockchain project (based on both market 
capitalization and number of users), Ethereum, 
registered only 780 commits in 2020 on its main 
GitHub page Go-Ethereum. Even more remarkable is 
the difference in hash rate. The highest hash rate 
registered by Bitcoin is ~170,000,000 TH/s, while 
Ethereum registered a maximum of ~600 TH/s.1   
Our study provides both practitioners and 
researchers with useful insights.  
From a research perspective, the model could 
represent a starting point for further investigating the 
determinants of the success of cryptocurrencies or 
blockchain projects in general. First, the model could 
be tested with other variables, such as pull requests and 
issues. Second, the presence of network effects in 
cryptocurrencies should be studied in detail. There are 
quite a few possible explanations why the number of 
end users grows when developers and miners become 
more active. It is conceivable that the effect is causal; 
for example, it could be an alternative form of herding. 
Users may be actively watching these supporting 
groups for cues that the technology is improving. 
Perhaps the effect is associational, and developers and 
miners are simply excellent at predicting growth in 
 
1 https://etherscan.io/chart/hashrate  
end-user demand. Another possibility is that all three 
variables are antecedents of some larger trend. For 
example, perhaps increasingly prosperous economies 
are causing all three variables to increase, and we 
notice the impact on development and infrastructure 
activities ahead of the effect on price.  
As we cannot differentiate between these 
explanations, future research should explore the 
reason for the observed network effects. More broadly, 
future research needs to consider contrasting direct 
and indirect network effects.   
From a managerial perspective, this analysis 
shows a promising means of distinguishing a 
successful cryptocurrency from one that is attracting 
speculative investment. Executives interested in long-
term investments in cryptocurrencies may wish to 
prioritize those projects with an active community of 
developers and a large network of miners. The 
aforementioned conclusion assumes a winner-take-all 
dynamic, whereby a small number of cryptocurrencies 
will eventually become the dominant players [38].  
5. Limitations and further research 
The contribution of this study should be evaluated 
in light of some limitations, which also provide 
directions for future research. First, the study is strictly 
limited to the case of Bitcoin. Although Bitcoin is the 
most widely discussed cryptocurrency, it should still 
be noted that our model has been tested only on 
Bitcoin data. Therefore, future research could aim at 
analyzing the robustness of our model to other 
cryptocurrencies or to other blockchain projects.  
Second, other statistical approaches should be 
tested. Vector Auto Regressions and Granger 
Causality Tests are popular for testing temporal data, 
but other alternatives exist that could add further 
insight. For example, an additional approach could be 
to apply the Hidden Markov Method, and then 
relationships among different dependent variables 
could be observed with Dynamic Linear Regression 
Models. Quasi-experimental methods such as 
difference-in-differences testing could also be used to 
study natural experiments, such as forks or external 
shocks like high-profile endorsements (or criticisms). 
Third, we consider active users as our main metric 
for Bitcoin’s success. However, this metric has three 
limitations. First, it assumes that Bitcoin is a payment 
network whose users exchange Bitcoin for services or 
products. As of today, however, Bitcoin is often 
considered a store of value rather than a real currency. 
Eventually, all the addresses could be an alternative 
metric for success to take into consideration. Second, 
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one end-user may own multiple addresses. Likewise, 
exchanges could hold Bitcoins owned by different 
end-users in a single address. These factors could 
serve to make our metric less precise. Finally, the 
transaction volume has not been considered. Thus, 
there is no distinction between one user who 
exchanges one bitcoin and another who exchanges 
1000 bitcoins. 
6. Conclusion  
We began this paper by highlighting the 
importance of identifying the determinants of 
cryptocurrencies’ success beyond the market hype.  
For this reason, we created an original database of 
4,285 daily data on Bitcoin. Based on this data pool, 
we developed a time-series model to observe Granger 
Causality between the success of Bitcoin and the 
developers’ and miners’ activities.   
Despite the substantial monodirectional emphasis 
on the price of cryptocurrencies in discourse, we 
showed that the number of active addresses is a useful 
alternative metric to study the success of this 
technology. Finally, we demonstrated that developers’ 
and miners’ activities precede an increase in the 
number of Bitcoin end users.  
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